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CHAIN OF CUSTODY REQUIREMENTS IN
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Michael B. Anderson
In the investigation and preparation of a case, an attorney will
sometimes find that crucial evidence has passed through several
parties' possession. The transfer may have occurred prior to the
event in issue (products liability cases); or the transfer itself may
be the precise event in issue (sale of dangerous drugs); or the trans-
fer may have occurred after the event in issue (chemical analysis of
blood or drug samples). Each transfer affords, however, the possibil-
ity of accidental or willful alteration of the item. There may be a
potential loss of ability to positively prove that the item offered in
evidence was the item involved in the transaction in question. The
party opposing the offer of evidence may seek to exploit the lack of
positive identification or raise the possibility of alteration. The
court is then faced with the question of whether the evidence should
be admitted. Such a situation occurred in the recent Montana case
of State v. Thomas.'
I. THE DECISION OF STATE V. THOMAS
The defendant was convicted of sale of dangerous drugs. The
state's case included testimony from a witness who was found in
possession of a blue box, containing a plastic bag the contents of
which proved to be marijuana. The witness testified that she saw
the defendant transfer a plastic bag to her friend at eight o'clock
that morning. The friend retained possession until noon, when she
transferred the blue box to the witness. The witness retained posses-
sion until two o'clock that afternoon, when the school superintend-
ent discovered the box in her possession.
The defendant, Thomas, contended that the state's evidence
had been improperly admitted because the state had not estab-
lished a continuous chain of possession from him to the school su-
perintendent. The defendant sought to exploit two breaks in the
chain of possession: first, when the evidence was in possession of the
witness' friend, and second, when the evidence was in possession of
the witness. The defendant cited in support an Iowa case, Joynerlb.
Utterback,2 for the proposition that, if one link in the chain of pos-
session is missing, the exhibit cannot be introduced.
The court distinguished Joyner as involving chain of custody
1. State v. Thomas, 32 St. Rep. 229, 532 P.2d 405 (1975).
2. Joyner v. Utterback, 196 Iowa 1040, 195 N.W. 594 (1923).
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after confiscation by law enforcement officials3 and affirmed the
conviction. The Montana supreme court found that, where the evi-
dence was inexorably linked to the defendant, mere conjecture of
the possibility of tampering was insufficient to preclude the intro-
duction of the evidence. It further stated that the defendant's bur-
den was to show affirmatively that tampering had taken place.' As
a guideline, the court stated:
In each case the trial judge before he admits it in evidence must
be satisfied that in reasonable probability the article has not been
changed in important respects . . . In reaching his conclusion he
must be guided by the nature of the article, the circumstances
surrounding the preservation and custody of it, and the likelihood
of intermeddlers tampering with it.'
II. THE EFFECT OF STATE v. THOMAS
The Thomas decision appears to be an attempt to balance bur-
dens between the offeror of evidence and the opposing counsel. Evi-
dence must still be linked to the defendant and must be reasonably
free from change in important respects.' However, the opponent of
its introduction must go beyond mere conjecture and affirmatively
show tampering.
Some questions remain, however. While distinguishing Joyner
as a post-confiscation case, and holding the Thomas case to involve
a pre-confiscation issue, the court cited as support for its conclusion
State v. Olsen,7 a post-confiscation case. In Olsen, burglary tools
and fruits of the crime were locked in the defendant's car by law
enforcement officials. They then drove the car from Baker to Sid-
ney, with a half-hour stop in Glendive, during which interval the car
was left unattended. The quotation regarding reasonable absence of
material change appearing in State v. Thomas was the court's re-
sponse rejecting the defendant's position that it was:
• . . incumbent upon the prosecution to prove there was absolutely
no possibility that the exhibits had been tampered with during the
time the car was left unattended.'
The court's use of the Olsen case to distinguish the Joyner post-
confiscation setting raises doubts whether pre- or post-confiscation
is a distinction without a difference, or whether there remains an
implied requirement of a complete chain of possession in the post-
3. State v. Thomas, supra note 1 at 406.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 407, citing State v. Olsen, 152 Mont. 1, 10; 445 P.2d 926, 931 (1968).
6. Id.
7. State v. Olsen, supra note 5.
8. Id. at 931.
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It is as yet unclear when the defendant's affirmative burden to
show tampering will arise. In Thomas the evidence said to be "inex-
orably linked" to the defendant.' Will the burden be less when the
connection becomes more tenuous? Will the burden rest with the
prosecution to negate tampering when the link is less "inexorable"?
How does placing an affirmative burden of showing tampering affect
the traditional resolution of doubts in favor of a criminal defendant?
It is this writer's contention that the uncertainties arising from the
court's analysis unreasonably detract from what may have been a
proper result, and that the appropriate guidelines are available to
minimize the confusion.
III. AN ATTEMPT AT CLARIFICATION
The Montana Code of Criminal Procedure offers clear guide-
lines regarding control and disposition of articles seized by law en-
forcement officials. 0 Basically, the procedure calls for prompt deliv-
ery to the judge of instruments, articles and things seized, taking
of an inventory, and providing a copy to the person from whom the
property was taken. The judge enters an order for the custody or
appropriate disposition of the items seized pending further proceed-
ings." If no arrest is made, items seized without warrant may be
retained in custody of the seizing officer for sufficient time for inves-
tigation of the crime, then delivered to the proper judge for disposi-
tion orders. 2 A person claiming right of possession of the seized
items may apply to the judge for return, where, upon notice and
hearing, the judge may order the property returned if it is not
needed for evidence or if satisfactory arrangements can be made for
its return for subsequent use as evidence. 3
If followed, this procedure may well eliminate many problems
arising in chain of custody cases. The items will be subject to court
supervision from early in the case until their use as evidence or
return to their possessor. Adequate records will show what was
taken and its manner of custody. Appropriate orders may apply to
objects which may change or deteriorate with time. Sufficient inves-
tigation may proceed with court approval. An experienced judge
may be able to issue tailored instructions for the custody and dispo-
sition of property according to its nature. At this time, however, the
9. State v. Thomas, supra note 1 at 406.
10. See generally, REviSED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), [hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
1947], §§ 95-712-95-715.
11. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-713.
12. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-714.
13. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-715.
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procedures are virtually untouched by judicial decision."
The statute presently involved in chain of custody cases is Sec-
tion 93-1201-1, R.C.M. 1947, which states:
Whenever an object, cognizable by the senses, has such a relation
to the fact in dispute as to afford reasonable grounds of belief
respecting it, or to make an item in the sum of the evidence, such
object may be exhibited to the jury, or its existence, situation or
character may be proved by witnesses. The admission of such evi-
dence must be regulated by the sound discretion of the court.
The thrust of the statute is to require the object to be relevant to
the fact in dispute. Toward this end, it is generally held that an
adequate foundation consists of testimony that the object offered is
the object which was involved in the incident, and that its condition
is substantially unchanged.' 5
A. Identification
The threshold determination is identification. When the object
sought to be introduced is readily identifiable, its admissibility
should provide few difficulties, regardless of who has had custody
of it. This category of ready identifiability may explain the result
reached in State v. Fitzpatrick." There, the state offered blood-
stained clothing which the defense challenged for lack of identifying
marks placed on the items. The challenge was held to be without
merit, for the offered items were easily identified. 7 This threshold
requirement could have been satisfied in Thomas, if it were shown
that a distinctive blue box changed hands and that the marijuana
was found in that box.' 8 It may not be significant that the items are
fungible, provided they are somehow identifiable.'" Attempts to
identify items by seals, tags, packaging or marking may well satisfy
14. Only one case is known by this writer to have reached the Montana supreme court.
State v. Nanoff, - Mont. -, 509 P.2d 837 (1973), involved the return of a gun to the
defendant, convicted of a felony 20 years earlier, where the gun was seized under a faulty
search warrant and without authority.
15. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, p. 527, (2d. Ed. 1972); State v. Byrne, 60 Mont.
317, 325; 199 P. 262, 264 (1921); State v. Wong Fong, 75 Mont. 81, 87; 241 P. 1072 (1925);
See also, Note, Preconditions for Admission of Demonstrative Evidence, 61 N.W.U.L. REV.
472, 481 (1966).
16. State v. Fitzpatrick, 163 Mont. 220, 516 P.2d 605 (1973).
17. Offered items included: a gray sweatshirt with the name "Fitzpatrick" thereon and
including a distinctive design on the back; a pair of denim trousers from which the pockets
had been torn; a pocket matching the trousers with the name "Fitzpatrick" on it. Id. at 608.
18. See also, State v. Olsen, supra note 5 (burglary tools and jewelry); State v. Byrne,
supra note 15 (skull fragments).
19. An extreme example, notable in overlooking possibilities of tampering is State v.
Wong Fong, supra note 15. There, a package alleged to contain cocaine was admitted. While
the package was retained by the sheriff, the sample used in identifying the substance is only
accounted for by the statement it was taken by a chemist for analysis.
1976]
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 37 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol37/iss1/7
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the requisite uniqueness for identifying otherwise indistinguishable
items.2 0
An item may be so indistinguishable as to be unidentifiable.
This category finds support in the decision of Richardson v. Farmers
Union Oil Company,2 1 a civil case dealing with the admissibility of
evidence concerning petroleum fuel obtained subsequent to a fire
which was offered to prove its condition at a time prior to the fire.
The court found the evidence inadmissible, stating:
Plaintiff contends that with respect to his offers of proof, the length
of time elapsing before the examinations were made would not
affect the competency of admissibility of such evidence, but
merely its weight. . . We find no fault with this principle applied
as it was in that case to something obvious, but in this case we are
not dealing with something which is obvious...2
The extent to which identifiability controls admission of evi-
dence is strongly emphasized in the case of Lestico v. Kuehner,23 a
case cited by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Olsen.24
Lestico involved a personal injury action wherein the plaintiff
claimed the car accident was caused by defendant's excessive speed.
In defense, the defendant sought to introduce a punctured tire cas-
ing, indicating another cause for his accident. Objection was made
by the plaintiff as to chain of custody of the tire. The court treated
the contention summarily:
It is utterly immaterial in how many or whose hands the tire had
been so long as it could be identified.25
20. See, Note, 110 U.PA.L.REv. 895, 896 (1962), stating, "... in states where the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act has been adopted, some courts have accepted, in
lieu of continuous possession, records indicating that the specimen remained unchanged
while it was in the custody of the testing laboratory." See also, State v. Burtchett, 31 St. Rep.
739, 530 P.2d 471 (1974), where the examining chemist testified to receipt and personal
delivery of the samples of arson evidence to Montana. See also, State v. Frates, 160 Mont.
431, 434; 503 P.2d 47, 49 (1972), where "[t]he evidence establishes a chain of possession of
the LSD tablets from defendant to the arresting officers; from there to tagging, marking and
storing in the evidence vault at the Billings police department; the packaging and addressing
of four of the tablets to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in San Francisco; the
receipt of the four pills by that agency; their examination, testing, and identification by
chemist Chan of that agency; and, the return of the plastic container, the mailing box, and
the mailing wrapper, bearing the handwriting of one of the Billings officers, to the Billings
police department. Under such circumstances, the absence of the direct testimony of the
person who actually mailed them to San Francisco is immaterial ....
21. Richardson v. Farmers Union Oil Company, 131 Mont. 535, 312 P.2d 134 (1957).
22. Id. at 139.
23. Lestico v. Kuehner, 204 Minn. 125, 283 N.W. 122 (1938).
24. State v. Olsen, supra note 5.
25. Lestico v. Kuehner, supra note 23 at 125.
[Vol. 37
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B. Absence of Material Change
Having first determined the evidence can be identified, a court
should then consider whether the offered items have suffered so
material a change as to lose their evidentiary value. Change should
not affect admissibility, but should go to the weight of the evidence.
A jury could then assess the weight of the offered evidence in light
of the burdens of proof prevailing in a civil or criminal case. Prefer-
ence should be for admission, provided the evidence is properly
identified. In such case, chain of custody may have more impact on
identification than absence of change. A court still retains the right
to preclude introduction of evidence which, because of inadequate
proof of its custody, may be unduly prejudicial, cause surprise or
confusion, or waste the court's time. But an appellate court should
refrain from creating new, affirmative burdens on a party, as was
done in State v. Thomas, when existing burdens will suffice.
Several cases indicate a refusal to place a burden on an offering
party to affirmatively exclude all possibility of change."6 In fact,
change may be significant without destroying the evidentiary value
of the offered evidence.
Even though the object is not in exactly the same condition at trial
as at the time in issue-or even in substantially the same condi-
tion-the exhibit may still be admitted if the changes can be ex-
plained and they do not destroy the evidentiary value of the ob-
ject.27
The most effective control over the evidentiary value of offered
evidence is the relative burdens of proof between parties based on
whether the case is a civil or criminal action. The same item may
be admitted with different result depending on whether the stan-
dard is preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards governing admissibility remain the same for
both civil and criminal litigation, as they should.2 1 Yet, by letting
identity control admissibility and change go to weight, inconsis-
26. State v. Wong Fong, supra note 15 at 1074: "It was not necessary that all possibility
of its having been tampered with should be excluded by affirmative testimony." State v.
Olsen, supra note 5 at 931: "But there is no hard and fast rule that the prosecution must
exclude all possibility that the article may have been tampered with .. " State v. Thomas,
supra note 1 at 406-407: "Defendant, however, simply alleges that the possibility of tampering
existed while the plastic bag was in the possession of Miss Shelly. This mere conjecture by
defendant is not sufficient to preclude the introduction of this evidence. Defendant's burden
was to show affirmatively that tampering had, taken place." However, State v. Burtchett,
supra note 20: "The State must identify the particular exhibit as relevant to the criminal
charge and must show prima facie that no alteration or tampering with the exhibit occurred.
Once that has been done, the burden of proving alteration shifts to appellant."
27. Note, Preconditions for Admission of Demonstrative Evidence, supra note 15 at 484.
28. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE P. 16, § 4 (3d ed. 1940).
1976]
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tency may be avoided and confusion lessened. A judge, assured of
an offered item's identity, need not dwell on change of condition as
a matter of law, but leave that task to opposing attorneys arguing
their clients' interests, with a jury weighing the impact of the offered
evidence.
An applied example may be helpful. In State v. Thomas, the
question of whose burden it was to show tampering, or absence of
tampering, could have been resolved on a full disclosure by both
prosecution and defense counsel. The prosecutor would have ini-
tially been required to offer witness testimony identifying the blue
box and its contents. Defense counsel could have objected by chal-
lenging the identity of this evidence. If the evidence were admitted,
defense counsel could then have attempted to create a reasonable
doubt that would have reduced the weight of the evidence by offer-
ing possibilities of tampering. This approach might have been di-
rected at those who possessed the box prior to its confiscation, or
directed at those who performed chemical analyses on its contents.
In the latter instance, the prosecutor may then have been able to
rely, in part, on a rebuttable presumption of official regularity in
handling the item.29 Defense counsel could then have argued its
opportunity to discover evidence of tampering was so limited, the
item being kept in law enforcement channels, that the prosecution
should have made a stronger showing than mere reliance on a re-
buttable presumption. Defendant could have offered evidence to
rebut the presumption, attempting to create a reasonable doubt by
showing the item was not handled with official regularity. In re-
sponse, the prosecutor could have offered official records of custody.
In reaching a decision as to the weight of the offered evidence, the
jury would thus have been determining whether there existed rea-
sonable doubt. Such a decision would have been based on the fullest
possible disclosure of circumstances surrounding the evidence, not
on a legal determination of an affirmative burden to be placed on a
defendant. By this method, the pre-confiscation/post-confiscation
dilemma is also resolved. Where both parties have relatively equal
access to proof of tampering, as would likely happen in pre-
confiscation settings, the burdens would remain evenly distributed
between both parties. But where items remained in official custody,
or in the hands of an opponent, the burden rests more heavily on
the holder of the evidence to show he handled the evidence properly.
Doubts may still be resolved in favor of a criminal defendant.
29. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7 provides: "All other presumptions may be contro-
verted. . . . (15) That official duty has been regularly performed."
[Vol. 37
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IV. CONCLUSION
The chain of custody requirement is most important when it is
a vital link in proving identity of the offered evidence; without a
showing of custody it is as likely as not the evidence analyzed was
not the evidence originally involved in the incident. But where the
question is not whether the offered item was the original, but
whether its condition has changed, the court should properly admit
the evidence and let what doubt exists be resolved by a jury measur-
ing its weight against the burden of proof required to prevail in a
civil or criminal case.
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